Seoul: The United States' decision to consider allowing Saudi Arabia to pursue domestic uranium enrichment for civilian nuclear power has highlighted a notable inconsistency in Washington's nonproliferation policy, raising questions about the fairness and strategic logic of such an approach.
According to Yonhap News Agency, the arrangement, though uncertain due to President Donald Trump's condition that any nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia depends on Riyadh recognizing Israel, marks a significant shift in U.S. policy. This move indicates that Washington is willing, under certain conditions, to rethink its opposition to uranium enrichment by additional partner countries. This development has prompted questions about why Korea, despite being a close ally and responsible nuclear state, continues to face restrictions dating back more than fifty years.
The proposed U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation framework reportedly included plans for American companies to build a low-enriched uranium facility in Saudi Arabia, pending technical and regulatory reviews. However, the political condition set by Trump has cast doubt on the proposal's future. Still, the proposal itself represents a notable departure from Washington's traditional policy of discouraging domestic uranium enrichment in nuclear newcomer states due to its dual-use potential.
In stark contrast, Korea, a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1975 and a signatory of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Additional Protocol since 2004, remains under restrictions. Despite its compliance with international safeguards and commitment to peaceful nuclear energy, Seoul cannot enrich uranium without U.S. approval, a constraint that has persisted since the U.S.-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement was first concluded in 1974.
Saudi Arabia, by comparison, has not adopted the IAEA's Additional Protocol, yet Washington appears open to negotiating uranium enrichment with Riyadh while maintaining restrictions on Seoul. This has drawn criticism, with outlets like The New York Times highlighting the disparity as a double standard that undermines the credibility of the global nonproliferation regime.
Korea's nuclear industry is a leader globally, operating 26 commercial reactors and ranking among the top nuclear power producers and exporters. Yet, the country continues to import all of its nuclear fuel despite having the technological capability to produce it domestically. The existing arrangement is increasingly seen as outdated and misaligned with strategic realities.
The U.S. imports much of its enriched uranium and seeks to reduce dependency on geopolitical rivals while diversifying trusted supply chains. Encouraging enrichment capabilities among reliable allies like Korea could bolster the resilience of the Western nuclear fuel market and enhance energy security. Korea's advanced nuclear technology and exemplary nonproliferation record make it a dependable partner for the U.S. in ensuring future supplies of civilian nuclear fuel.
Both governments have acknowledged the need to revisit the bilateral nuclear agreement, with Seoul reportedly seeking authority similar to Japan's, which enriches uranium under international safeguards. Granting Korea greater autonomy over its civilian nuclear fuel cycle would reward responsible behavior, transparency, and alliance commitments, reinforcing that America's alliances are based on trust rather than outdated restrictions.
If the U.S. is considering uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia, it cannot justifiably argue that Korea must remain bound by limitations from 1974. Modernizing the bilateral nuclear agreement with Korea would recognize its maturity as a responsible nuclear power and strengthen the Seoul-Washington alliance for the future.